

Whose aid? Credit-attribution for foreign aid amongst ethnic minorities

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Abstract

Citizens in aid-dependent countries often expect their politicians to acquire aid and attribute credit to their political representatives for these internationally-provided goods. Politicians take efforts to target aid at their political supporters and may experience electoral backlash if aid goes to the wrong groups. However, the literature focuses on the effects of aid for the majority, or politically-empowered, groups. Do politically-disempowered groups, or minority groups, also reward politicians for acquiring aid? I theorize that minority group members have lower expectations of support from their political representatives, particularly politicians elected by majority-group members, and may be more willing to attribute credit for aid to the international community's influence than politicians'. Using a geolocated aid project data in sub-Saharan Africa, I show that citizens who do not share an ethnic identity with the ruling president are less likely to intend to vote for the president, compared to citizens who are coethnic with the president, when they are exposed to foreign aid. Instead, non-coethnic citizens respond to foreign aid exposure by attributing greater credit to non-government organizations. These results highlight the differences in expectations and credit-attribution between minority- and majority-group members and put forth a nuanced accounting of the relationship between foreign aid and incumbency in aid-dependent nations.

1 Introduction

Foreign aid is a political tool for both donors and recipients. While Hans Morgantheau famously referred to aid as a “bribe” used by donors to extract policy favors from recipients

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(Morgenthau, 1962), recent work has drawn attention to aid's use as a bribe from recipient governments to potential political supporters. In many nations, politicians use their influence to target aid at supporters proactively (Briggs, 2021; Seim *et al.*, 2020) and retroactively (Jablonski, 2014). Importantly, aid is a political benefit to incumbent politicians when it meets or exceeds expectations of their voting base (Cruz & Schneider, 2017; Dolan, 2020; Guiteras *et al.*, 2015; Jablonski, 2014).

Aid is often targeted to coethnics of recipient politicians due to the utility of ethnicity as a political cleavage in many developing contexts (Habyarimana *et al.*, 2009). In circumstances where donors have less control over the targeting of aid, leaders are especially likely to target aid at their coethnics (Dreher *et al.*, 2019). In this respect, aid does not differ substantially from other public and private goods in a given country; ethnic favoritism is a well-documented phenomenon (De Luca *et al.*, 2018; Franck & Rainer, 2012; Kramon & Posner, 2016).

Foreign aid offers an opportunity to examine the implications of ethnic targeting because it is difficult to accurately attribute credit for aid due to the complicated chain of events that predates an aid project (Winters, 2014). Many actors coordinate in the design, allocation, and implementation of aid projects. This leaves room for citizens to attribute credit for the project to multiple actors. In the case of ethnic targeting of aid, people of some ethnicities may expect that they received aid as a result of the preferences of their political representatives or not.

I theorize that citizens' expectations of aid are informed by their prior engagement with the state and with donor entities. In particular, I posit that in countries with clear ethnic cleavages in political representation, the provision of aid will be seen along ethnic lines. People who are coethnics with politicians in power may perceive these representatives as targeting aid at their communities and will attribute credit to the politicians when aid is received. In contrast, non-coethnic people may be less likely to expect that politicians in power who do not share their ethnic identity will actively target their communities with aid. Instead, they will attribute the presence of aid to the role of the international community, and non-government organizations (NGOs) in particular, given that NGOs may be more

responsive to the needs of these constituents generally (Springman, 2020a).

I summarize the existing literature on aid, credit, and incumbency in the following section. I then describe my empirical strategy, a difference-in-differences design that accounts for selection into aid projects temporally and geographically. Evidence from project-level aid data and geolocated public opinion data in sub-Saharan Africa supports this theory. However, the relationship between coethnicity and credit for aid to incumbent politicians is only robust in polities where ethnic targeting of aid is a common political phenomenon. I outline several potential extensions of the empirics that may help us understand the circumstances under which ethnicity may moderate the aid relationship and the extent to which characteristics of aid projects themselves may affect political credit attribution.

2 Foreign aid, credit attribution, and ethnic minorities

Foreign aid may benefit recipient politicians electorally (Briggs, 2012, 2015; Cruz & Schneider, 2017; Guiteras *et al.*, 2015; Jablonski, 2014). Incumbent politicians often see increases in the level of support they receive from constituents as a function of the aid allocated to their localities. The mechanisms through which aid may lead to an increase in incumbent support are twofold: first, foreign aid may be a signal of government quality if citizens expect aid to be delivered as part of a package of public or private goods. The quality of foreign aid, which citizens may perceive as higher than the quality of government-provided aid, may also reflect well on the politicians who are associated with the aid package (Ijaz, 2020; Winters *et al.*, 2017). Importantly, this attribution of credit may be unwarranted; Cruz & Schneider (2017) demonstrate that politicians take active measures to draw associations between themselves and foreign aid in order to claim undeserved credit for its economic benefits. Second, foreign aid adds additional resources that signal political priorities for recipient politicians. If citizens believe their representatives played a role in acquiring aid, the type and location of aid is a visible sign of a politicians' preferences for resource distribution. O'Brien-Udry (2021) shows that aid targeted at ethnic minorities may signal a disconnect between the

public goods preferences of politicians and their ethnic majority constituents.

However, the association between incumbency support and foreign aid is mediated by citizens' expectations of foreign aid. (Briggs, 2019) finds that exposure to foreign aid decreases incumbent support in several countries in sub-Saharan Africa, postulating that citizens may expect the quality of foreign aid to exceed its actual performance and thereby causing citizens to update negatively about the quality of their incumbent representative. In Malawi, citizens accurately attribute credit to foreign aid to politicians for whom foreign aid management or implementation falls under the purview of their political office, and not otherwise (Baldwin & Winters, 2021). Evidence from Bangladesh shows that politicians are not attributed undue credit when citizens are informed of the source of aid funding (Guiteras *et al.*, 2015). Marx (2017) traces how politicians across Africa are rewarded for completion of aid projects at more than their implementation and, as a result, politicians speed up completion of projects in response to these electoral incentives. O'Brien-Udry (2021) finds that aid targeted at out-groups leads to lower approval of incumbent politicians as these projects are misaligned with the priorities of in-group constituents. And Briggs (2019) finds a negative relationship between the start of aid projects and incumbent support, potentially through a mechanism of aid projects not meeting expectations. This theory has additional weight when evidence from Chinese foreign direct investment is considered: Wang *et al.* (Forthcoming) find that African respondents have higher approval ratings of incumbent politicians immediately after exposure to Chinese investment projects but that this effect turns negative over time as the investment projects do not bring the economic gains expected.

For countries in which ethnicity is a clear political cleavage along which public goods are allocated and elections contested, foreign aid is often targeted along ethnic lines. Politicians target aid at their coethnics, family members, and regions of origin (Briggs, 2014; Jablonski, 2014; Seim *et al.*, 2020).¹ A large body of literature discusses the utility and forms of ethnic aid targeting, including public versus private provision of goods and types of goods that can be easily targeted (Habyarimana *et al.*, 2009). Across all forms of governments and

¹While aid is often targeted towards coethnics by politicians, it can also be used to target marginal voters who may not be coethnics (Briggs, 2021).

continents, ethnic favoritism is evident; De Luca *et al.* (2018) find that leaders' coethnic regions see increases in nighttime lights after they come into power. This pattern may vary with sector, education is more responsive to ethnic ties to leadership than health (Franck & Rainer, 2012; Kramon & Posner, 2016), and spatial segregation (Ejdemyr *et al.*, 2018), with greater spatial segregation leading to increases public good allocation to coethnics. The mechanism through which this occurs, Habyarimana *et al.* (2009) posit in seminal work, is ability to easily find and identify coethnics, allowing politicians to easily include and exclude groups from political coalitions.²

If foreign aid leads to greater incumbent support through the mechanisms of either directly-improved economic conditions or signaling greater ability of incumbents to deliver goods, ethnic minorities may view the presence of foreign aid differently from ethnic majorities due to different expectations of benefiting from the incumbent's policies. Ethnic minorities may be less likely to attribute credit for aid to non-coethnic politicians because they expect these politicians to target aid at coethnics, leading them to intuit greater agency in aid targeting to NGOs or foreign agents. Which politicians receive credit for aid may also differ; ethnic minorities may be more likely to believe local politicians have their best interests in mind rather than national politicians. If expectations of aid provision link aid to credit attribution, differential expectations by ethnicity should be relevant when ethnicity is a politically-salient cleavage. We should expect ethnic minorities to attribute less credit to majority recipient incumbents when they receive foreign aid.

3 Empirics

I use geolocated interview data from Afrobarometer to measure public opinion outcomes including confidence in different levels of government and voting intentions. Data on aid projects come from AidData, which scraped geolocated data from Aid Management Platforms (AMPs) in Nigeria, Senegal, Uganda, Sierra Leone, and Burundi. While these data

²Robinson (2017) challenges this axiom; she finds that coethnics are not able to identify each other and out groups a substantial portion of the time.

may not be fully comprehensive, they represent our best estimates of the location and timing of aid projects across most major donors in the sample of countries. Notably, countries with AMPs differ from countries without AMPs and these unobservable variations should be taken into account when we attempt to generalize from these results.

In pairing aid data and respondent data, I code respondents as “currently exposed” to aid if an aid project has a start (implementation) date in the year before or year of a round of the Afrobarometer survey. Respondents are coded as “exposed in the future” if an aid project starts one or two years after a round of the Afrobarometer survey. I only count exposure to aid projects as a function of their start dates due to the particular salience of the start of aid projects (Zeitz, 2021). This coding decision is a standard practice within the aid literature (Briggs, 2019; Kotsadam *et al.*, 2018; Knutsen & Kotsadam, 2020; Qian *et al.*, 2021; Zeitz, 2021); however, this assumption does remove the possibility of examining cumulative impacts of aid, may underestimate exposure by undercounting the volume of aid projects to which a respondent is exposed, or overestimate exposure if the start of an aid project is not as visible or substantially-impactful as its completion. I outline potential methods to account for these biases in Section 4.

In addition to temporal exposure to projects, I account for geographic exposure by measuring the distance between each respondent and each aid project in their country of residence. The data are measured at the individual level; if any aid project in the time window specified is within a given distance from a respondent, the respondent is coded as “exposed.” I measure multiple bandwidths of exposure, ranging from 5km to 100km. Again, this method does not account for cumulative aid projects as the variable takes on a binary value of 1 if exposed and 0 otherwise. Full details of the data in the AMPs and Afrobarometer are available in Appendix Section A.

I use only rounds three through five of the Afrobarometer survey due to data limitations before and after these rounds. Specifically, the main outcome of interest, whether respondents support the incumbent president, was first asked in round three of Afrobarometer and is therefore not available earlier. Additionally, the AMPs for each of the countries cover




Figure 1: *Geocoded respondents*: Afrobarometer respondents in Nigeria, Senegal, Uganda, Burundi, and Sierra Leone across rounds 3-5. Blue triangles indicate no exposure to aid in the two years before or after a survey round; orange circles indicate exposure to aid.

data from 1978 (Burundi, Uganda), 1988 (Nigeria), and 1992 (Senegal, Sierra Leone) through 2014. Additional rounds of the Afrobarometer survey, while including relevant outcomes, cannot usefully be matched to geolocated aid projects without these data.

I test the effect of foreign aid on minority respondents' perceptions of government using strategy closely related to the designs of Briggs (2019), Kotsadam *et al.* (2018), and Knutsen & Kotsadam (2020). Effectively, I compare individuals who have been exposed to aid projects in their vicinity in the last year to individuals who have not been exposed to aid projects in the window of time before or after the Afrobarometer survey. I then compare individuals who are about to be exposed to aid projects in the coming year to individuals who have not been exposed to any aid projects in the year before or after the Afrobarometer interview. For both of these estimates, I am interested in the effect of exposure to aid amongst respondents who share an ethnic group with the national incumbent president at the time of survey implementation compared to non-coethnic respondents. I take the difference between these

two estimates to identify the effect of aid on a battery of outcomes measuring support for government and non-government organisations. My outcome of interest is difference between the interaction term `non-coethnic*current_aid` and `non-coethnic*future_aid`. I expect that this term will be negative for the main model; non-coethnics will attribute less credit to incumbent presidents than coethnics. In interpreting this result, I do not claim that non-coethnics *reduce* their support for the president; the outcome of interest is a comparison to coethnics and should be treated as such.

3.1 Results

Table 1 depicts the main results for the relationship between exposure to aid and intention to vote for the incumbent president amongst respondents who are not co-ethnic with the president. Specifically, the outcome of interest is respondents' answer to the question, "If a presidential election were held tomorrow, which party's candidate would you vote for?" The binary vote choice is coded as 1 if the respondent aims to vote for the party of the president and 0 otherwise. In line with theoretical expectations, non-coethnics are less likely than coethnics to state their intention to vote for the incumbent president when exposed to foreign aid. This result is robust across multiple specifications: the difference between exposure to current aid and exposure to future aid, both in comparison to no exposure to aid, is significant at the 0.01% in Model 1, the main specification. Here, exposure to aid is measured with a 15 kilometer bandwidth and includes region-Afrobarometer-round fixed effects. Expanding the bandwidth to 50km in Model 2 does not substantively change the results, which are still significant at the 0.05% level. Using country-round fixed effects rather than region-round fixed effects in Model 3, and including covariates³ in Model 4, also results in the same relationship. Model 5 subsets the sample only to individuals who have been exposed to aid within a 100 km radius in order to better match treated and control areas; the results are consistent with the main finding that non-coethnics support the incumbent

³The covariates included are age, gender, and an indicator variable for whether the respondent lives in an urban or rural area. The covariates are also included with country interactions to flexibly control for variation in these values by nation, in line with Briggs (2019).

less than coethnics when they are exposed to aid.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Non-coethnic*	-0.047	0.038	-0.090	-0.043	-0.058
Present aid	(0.065)	(0.103)	(0.069)	(0.065)	(0.066)
Non-coethnic*	0.023	0.173	-0.049	0.034	0.012
Future aid	(0.088)	(0.164)	(0.086)	(0.089)	(0.088)
Difference-in-differences	-0.071	-0.135	-0.040	-0.077	-0.070
	(0.018)	(0.064)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.019)
Observations	15653	15653	15653	15653	15077
Country-round FE	-	-	Yes	-	-
Region-round FE	Yes	Yes	-	Yes	Yes
Covariates	-	-	-	Yes	-
Bandwidth	15k	50k	15k	15k	15k
Sample	All	All	All	All	Geomatch

Table 1: *Main results:* Effect of aid on intention to vote for incumbent president amongst non-coethnic respondents in Nigeria, Senegal, Uganda, Sierra Leone, and Burundi. Robust standard errors, clustered at the enumerator area, in parentheses. Standard error for difference between models calculated using an f -test.

3.1.1 Subsample analyses

I repeat the analysis with the sample of countries for which multiple rounds of the Afrobarometer survey were conducted in years for which we have AMP data: Nigeria, Senegal, and Uganda. Cross-sectional data may give biased results if there are temporal trends that affect global aid patterns in a given year. Subsetting to the sample of countries for which we have time series data allows us to account for these potential biases. Table ?? displays the results in the aggregate and for each individual country. [NOTE: I do not report the results for Senegal due to an upstream coding issue that I have yet to resolve.] For each of the reported models, I use the main specification of region-round fixed effects and a 15km bandwidth. The models are substantively robust to the alternative specifications in Table 1 and these results are available upon request.

The aggregate analysis of the subsample of countries supports the main findings. Both the Nigeria and Uganda results support the relationship between receiving aid and low support for incumbent presidents amongst non-coethnic respondents. However, the Nigeria

	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Non-coethnic*	-0.070	-0.048	NA	- 0.016
Present aid	(0.071)	(0.145)	NA	(0.078)
Non-coethnic*	0.024	-0.016	NA	0.130
Future aid	(0.090)	(0.114)	NA	(0.137)
Difference-in-differences	-0.146	-0.031	NA	-0.146
	(0.020)	(0.055)	NA	(0.071)
Observations	17386	11603	3080	2703
Region-round FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Bandwidth	15k	15k	15k	15k
Sample	Nigeria, Senegal, Uganda	Nigeria	Senegal	Uganda

Table 2: *Subsample results*: Effect of aid on intention to vote for incumbent president amongst non-coethnic respondents in Nigeria, Senegal, and Uganda. Robust standard errors, clustered at the enumerator area, in parentheses. Standard error for difference between models calculated using an f -test.

results are not statistically-significant, though they point in the suggested direction. The Uganda subsample shows a robust and statistically-significant relationship between non-coethnic respondents and comparatively-lower support for the incumbent.

These results suggest that, in line with the theory, non-coethnics will vary in support for incumbents after exposure to aid only if aid is ethnically-targeted and ethnicity a salient political cleavage. In Uganda, ethnic fractionalization is considered a major driver of conflict and ethnic favoritism in public goods provision is well-documented. Within aid provision, Springman (2020a, 29) finds that “co-ethnicity [with the president] is negatively associated with NGO activity, suggesting that NGOs may target communities under-served by the current government.” Nigeria, on the other hand, has three major ethnic groups competing.

An extension of the analysis could examine the subset of respondents for whom ethnicity is a particularly salient identity to better understand the mechanism through which ethnicity moderates the effects of aid on incumbent support. Section 4 also proposes additional analysis of countries outside of the African continent to better understand a variety of configurations of ethnic politics and aid.

3.1.2 Non-Government Organizations

A large and growing literature on bypass aid suggests that non-government organization (NGO) service provision positively affects citizens' perceptions of their governments because they attribute credit to representative politicians for acquiring this aid (Baldwin & Winters, 2018, 2020; Cruz & Schneider, 2017; Dolan, 2020; Springman, 2020b,a). Additionally, NGO-provided goods may be more effective than government goods, which could lead to higher approval ratings of governments who provide these goods. Springman (2020a) shows that, in Uganda, citizens attribute credit to the president for even aid that is provided by NGOs. In Bangladesh, Dietrich *et al.* (2018) find that NGO aid that is clearly funded by USAID improves perceptions of government officials.

However, if non-coethnics differentially attribute credit to the president for aid compared to coethnics, the question remains whether they attribute no credit to any actor or if they alter the composition of the credit they attribute to actors. It is possible that non-coethnics do not integrate good information when it could be attributed to the president; Adida *et al.* (2017) find that non-coethnics integrate bad information about incumbent politicians public goods provision in Benin, but not good information. Another possibility is that aid is so effectively targeted at coethnics of the president that non-coethnics do not benefit from its presence in their communities. On the other hand, if aid does benefit non-coethnics, they may attribute this credit to NGOs instead of the incumbent president. While much of the literature on bypass aid has noted a positive effect on government legitimacy, for citizens who do not believe the government has their best interests in mind, credit may be attributed to NGOs rather than the president.

I use the question, "In your opinion, how much do each of the following do to help your country, or haven't you heard enough to say?" for the actor "Other international donors and NGOs (apart from the United Nations)." Answers are coded as follows: 0 = "Do nothing, no help," 1 = "Help a little bit," 2 = "Help somewhat," 3 = "Help a lot". The question was fielded only on round four of the Afrobarometer survey so the data here are a cross-sectional

	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
Non-coethnic*	-0.162	-0.397	-0.156	-0.174	-0.180
Present aid	(0.140)	(0.262)	(0.125)	(0.141)	(0.142)
Non-coethnic*	-0.280	-0.173	-0.312	-0.264	-0.298
Future aid	(0.174)	(0.284)	(0.176)	(0.176)	(0.176)
Difference-in-differences	0.117	-0.224	0.156	0.089	0.118
	(0.046)	(0.125)	(0.043)	(0.047)	(0.048)
Observations	5151	4427	5151	5151	5093
Country-round FE	-	-	Yes	-	-
Region-round FE	Yes	Yes	-	Yes	Yes
Covariates	-	-	-	Yes	-
Bandwidth	15k	50k	15k	15k	15k
Sample	All	All	All	All	Geomatch

Table 3: *NGO results*: Effect of aid on perception of helpfulness of NGOs amongst non-coethnic respondents in Nigeria, Senegal, and Uganda. Robust standard errors, clustered at the enumerator area, in parentheses. Standard error for difference between models calculated using an f -test.

sample of respondents from Nigeria, Senegal, and Uganda.⁴ If non-coethnics are more likely to view NGOs as helpful after exposure to aid than coethnics, this would constitute evidence that non-coethnics are shifting credit from the incumbent president to NGOs for aid provision.

Table 3 depicts results for multiple model specifications. Across four of the five models, and in line with theoretical expectations, non-coethnics increase their perception of the helpfulness of NGOs when exposed to aid in comparison to coethnics. Model 11, which increases the bandwidth of aid exposure to 50km, reverses the coefficient on non-coethnic exposure to aid; future research should examine how distance affects perceptions of NGO effectiveness. One potential explanation could be that NGOs serve more localized communities, so citizens exposed to aid from further away may be less likely to attribute credit to NGOs for this aid if they also are further from the NGOs.

⁴Round 4 of Afrobarometer was not fielded in Burundi or Sierra Leone.

3.1.3 Additional outcomes

I report results for additional outcomes of interest in Tables 4 and 5. I test the effect of aid exposure on trust in (Table 4) and approval of (Table 5) different actors and levels of government. The first outcome, trust in and approval of the president, can be considered a robustness test for the main results. Indeed, non-coethnics have lower levels of trust in the president compared to coethnics when exposed to aid (though the result is statistically insignificant at conventional levels) and have lower approval ratings (a statistically significant result). Parliament, too, receives lower levels of trust and approval from non-coethnics.

	(15) President	(16) Parliament	(17) Local gov- ernment	(18) Opposition party	(19) Ruling party
Non-coethnic* Present aid	-0.193 (0.147)	-0.169 (0.127)	-0.240 (0.151)	-0.050 (0.118)	-0.103 (0.106)
Non-coethnic* Future aid	-0.149 (0.230)	-0.007 (0.193)	-0.032 (0.199)	0.016 (0.173)	-0.317 (0.166)
Difference-in- differences	-0.044 (0.046)	-0.162 (0.038)	-0.207 (0.043)	-0.066 (0.035)	0.214 (0.032)
Observations	19757	19298	19431	19548	19215

Table 4: *Trust results*: Effect of aid on trust in government amongst non-coethnic respondents in Nigeria, Senegal, Uganda, Sierra Leone, and Burundi. Robust standard errors, clustered at the enumerator area, in parentheses. Standard error for difference between models calculated using an f -test.

Interestingly, and not in line with theoretical expectations, local governments also receive lower trust and approval ratings from non-coethnics, though the latter relationship is not statistically-significant. As it is probable that non-coethnics of the president may share ethnic identities with more local representatives, this finding calls into question whether local politicians are indeed attributed credit for aid to their localities. In line with work by Bueno (2018), who shows that bypass aid from national governments may be directed at localities whose representatives are not aligned with the national government in order to remove possibilities of credit-attribution for these representatives, citizens may observe the linkages and patronage opportunities between local and national politicians and assume aid is a function of the relationship to the national government. Potentially, this could result in

localities of non-coethnics of the president seeing aid as a function of NGOs and not their local governments due to presumed lack of linkages.

Also against theoretical expectations, the ruling party receives an increase in trust as a result of exposure to aid amongst non-coethnics while the opposition party sees trust decline. Theoretically, we would expect approval of the ruling party to move in the same direction as the president and parliament. Our theory does not predict movement in trust of the opposition party in response to exposure to aid; it is possible that non-coethnics could see the opposition party as advocating for their interests in the targeting of aid and reward them for such, but the empirical results point in the opposite direction. Future research should examine the differences between credit attribution to parties versus individual politicians.

	(20) President	(21) Parliament	(22) Local government
Non-coethnic*	-0.128	-0.082	-0.169
Present aid	(0.147)	(0.141)	(0.119)
Non-coethnic*	0.023	0.327	-0.119
Future aid	(0.187)	(0.164)	(0.132)
Difference-in-differences	-0.151 (0.041)	-0.409 (0.037)	-0.049 (0.030)
Observations	19707	18636	19008

Table 5: *Approval results*: Effect of aid on approval of government amongst non-coethnic respondents in Nigeria, Senegal, Uganda, Sierra Leone, and Burundi. Robust standard errors, clustered at the enumerator area, in parentheses. Standard error for difference between models calculated using an f -test.

4 Extensions

4.1 Cross-continent analysis

The results in sub-Saharan Africa show a pattern consistent with non-coethnic respondents attributing credit for aid to NGOs rather than their political representatives. Does this finding hold in other areas of the world in which ethnic politics and aid may be more or less related? The full sample of countries for which Aid Management Platforms, or the data

Region	Country	Public Opinion (geocoded)
Latin America	Honduras	Americas Barometer
	Colombia	Americas Barometer
Asia	Nepal	Asia Barometer
	Timor Leste	Asia Barometer
Middle East	Iraq	??
Europe	Moldova	Life in Transition Survey
	Kosovo	Life in Transition Survey

Table 6: Countries with AMP data

within, are available are listed in Table 6. I also include a set of surveys for which geocoded respondent data are available and may be productively paired with the geocoded aid data in order to better understand the relationship between aid, coethnicity, and political credit.

4.2 Reanalysis

The observational causal inference work above points to a clear distinction between incumbent aid advantages amongst individuals that are coethnics with national leaders and non-coethnics. I extend this analysis by reanalyzing data from an experimental context in Bangladesh. Dietrich *et al.* (2018) use a survey experiment to test the effect of information about the funding source of a local development project on Bangladeshi citizens’ perceptions of domestic government legitimacy. This experiment provides a useful controlled setting in which to examine whether minority citizens in Bangladesh, primarily Bengali Hindus and Adivasis, differentially respond to information about aid. Respondents watch a video about an NGO’s work in Bangladesh and are randomly assigned to see USAID branding on the project.

Figure 2 depicts the interaction between USAID branding and minority status. Being a minority is not associated with any changes in perceptions of government legitimacy when viewing information about USAID’s funding of local development projects. In fact, the coefficient on `minority` is positive and significant across four outcomes assessing confidence in different government institutions. In this context, minority respondents do not differentially about the information contained in aid projects. Average respondents do see an increase

in local government confidence (second panel) and general confidence in institutions (first panel); interestingly, this is not driven by respondents in the ethnic majority group.




Figure 2: *Dietrich et al. (2018) Domestic government legitimacy* : Point estimates for effect of foreign aid on support for or confidence in different institutions and levels of government by minority status. 95% confidence intervals represented. Includes region-round fixed effects and standard errors clustered by township. Colors represent coefficients for treatment effect of USAID branding on outcomes, minority status, and the differential effect of USAID branding on outcomes amongst minority respondents.

4.3 Original survey evidence

I also am in the process of fielding an original survey experiment in Kosovo to better test the mechanisms through which minority and majority constituents update their perceptions of politicians in response to information about aid projects. The case of Kosovo allows me to usefully disentangle politicized minorities from less-politicized minorities as both constituents and targets of aid. A full pre-analysis plan for the project can be found in Appendix Section B.

5 Conclusion

The relationship between credit-attribution and public goods, particularly foreign aid, is mediated by citizens' expectations of political actors. In countries in which ethnicity is a

clear political cleavage along which public goods, including foreign aid, are targeted, it may be difficult for incumbent politicians to credibly receive support in return for providing aid in the vicinity ethnic minorities. If minorities do not expect that politicians will target their communities, they may attribute any benefits from aid to other actors in the chain of aid allocation and provision: in particular, NGOs.

I provide evidence from five countries, over 10000 individual respondents, and over 3000 aid projects that demonstrate a link between coethnic status and credit-attribution to politicians for aid. People who do not share an ethnic identity with the president are less likely to state their intention to vote for the president when exposed to an aid project, compared to people who do share an ethnic identity with the president. These individuals are also more likely to say that NGOs are helpful when exposed to aid projects than coethnics. This relationship is strongest in countries with clear ethnic cleavages and histories of ethnic aid targeting. Together, these results suggest that non-coethnics perceive other actors as more responsible for the aid that they receive than the president or their local representatives.

I suggest a nuanced understanding of the conditions under which politicians will be attributed credit for projects. Foreign aid is a useful tool for unpacking this relationship because of its complex chain of actors (Winters, 2014) and how the terms are negotiated privately (Swedlund, 2017), leaving open space for politicians to claim or be attributed credit for aid (Cruz & Schneider, 2017; Guiteras *et al.*, 2015). Citizens may receive bundled information about aid and, based on their priors, update accordingly. When citizen priors are informed by ethnic politics and strategic targeting of coethnics by politicians, citizens may rationally attribute credit to other actors. Aid is not new information; it builds on and complicates citizens' existing relationships with the state. I set forth a research agenda that better defines when, how, and why aid affects the relationship between politicians and their citizens.

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A Data

A.1 AMPs

TBD

A.2 Afrobarometer

TBD

B PAP

The following document describes two experiments embedded in an online survey to be fielded in Kosovo in April-May 2022. The designs directly test the claims made in observational causal work that minority aid causes a decrease in support for recipient politicians amongst majority constituents.

B.1 Design

I field two experiments: a vignette-based experiment and a conjoint experiment. The vignette experiment tests the direct effect of information about aid targeted at minorities on the approval of a local politician. This design is best matched to a framework in which individuals update their perceptions of a politician based on new information about the beneficiaries of an aid project with which the politician is associated. Additional mediation analysis allows me to test the mechanisms through which respondents may approve or disapprove of a politician.

The conjoint experiment, which features forced-choice tasks between different development projects, tests two additional components of the overall theory. First, it measures the extent to which majority constituents prefer aid projects that benefit their in-group over aid projects that benefit out-groups. Specifically, I can calculate the amount of aid a respondent would forgo in order for an out-group member not to receive aid. Second, I can test which features of a project might mitigate or enhance the effects of minority targeting on project approval. If symbolic aid drives these effects as much or more than substantive aid, respondents may be reacting less to the substantive impact of minority aid on the distribution of power and resources in society and more to the affective qualities of aid.

B.1.1 Covariates

I include standard covariates (gender, ethnicity, education, location, age, income, religion, political party and voting behavior,) and nonstandard covariates (militancy, perceptions of

fairness, identity salience, aid knowledge).

Nonstandard covariates

The militancy scale captures the extent to which respondents approve of the use of force in international affairs. I expect that individuals who have a more militant outlook will be less approving of minority aid to recalcitrant out-groups.

The fairness scale captures the extent to which respondents feel that the world is fair. Fairness perceptions are associated with trust in government, voting behaviors, and corruption. Fairness could affect minority aid perceptions in two countervailing ways: people who expect the world to be fair could see minorities as benefiting equitably from aid, or could see minorities as benefiting disproportionately and at the expense of other groups. I have no prediction as to the direction of treatment.

To measure identity salience, I assign respondents to one of two questions. In the first condition, respondents see the question “To what extent do you feel the following identities are salient to you?” with sliders from 0-100 for the attributes gender, ethnicity, religion, nationality, sexuality, and economic class. In the second, I use Zhou (n.d.)’s method of allocating “tokens” to different identity buckets: “Imagine you have ten tokens to allocate to different aspects of your identity. Please allocate these tokens amongst different attributes, with more tokens towards attributes you think are more important.” I do not have expectations of the behavior of bounded/unbounded identity categories but think it is interesting to see if there are differences in how people perceive their identity when limits are put on potential categories. I will also conduct subgroup analyses for the vignette and conjoint experiments for people with high and low ethnic and national attachments. I expect that, amongst people for whom ethnic identity is particularly salient, treatment effects of information about projects for minorities will be particularly negative in the vignette experiment. I also hypothesize that these individuals will have lower likelihoods of approving minority projects and will be more likely to forgo aid to minorities as a result.

In line with work by Baldwin & Winters (2020), I ask respondents an open-ended question about their familiarity with projects in their municipality (“Do you know of any projects

carried out in this municipality in the past five years that have improved the situation of people here?”). If respondents select “yes,” I then ask them to name specific projects and identify funders. I then field a question with selected, known, aid projects. I include some of the largest aid projects in Kosovo (EULEX, Kosovo Debt Management Support Program, Kosovo Energy Efficiency Fund (KEEF)). I also list the largest, most recent project in a respondent’s location (title dependent on municipality). I add a placebo project (Keep Kosovo Clean (KKC)) to test for desirability effects and attention. Finally, I randomize whether respondents see an additional project that is targeted at Serbs, Roma, or the general population.

In addition to asking if respondents are familiar with the projects, I ask respondents to select the countries/organizations they believe are responsible for the projects. I include all of the project funders and a placebo funder as potential selections, including the government of Kosovo which is a cofunder on several of the listed projects. The purpose of this block of questions is to better understand descriptively how familiar the average Kosovar is with aid projects. I will also conduct a subgroup analysis of the vignette and conjoint experiments with respondents with low and high aid project knowledge to test whether the proposed mechanism is only salient amongst people with low information about aid, as predicted by Guiteras *et al.* (2015) and Cruz & Schneider (2017).

B.2 Vignette Experiment

After the covariates, I field a standard information experiment. I use a real news clipping from a development project funded by the EU and the International Organization on Migration (IOM) Mission in Kosovo jointly with the Kosovar Ministry of Communities and Returns. The project involves the “construction of a retaining wall” on a road in a municipality that contains Roma, Serb, and Albanian populations. I do not name the municipalities involved (Kamenica and Novo Brdo) but can change this with no threat to the validity of the project. The vignette follows.

April 26, 2021 - Last week, the [EU/IOM/Ministry of Communities and Re-

turns]’s Community Stabilization Project IV successfully completed the construction of a retaining wall on a local road. The road had collapsed due to heavy rainfall and flooding had cut off villages, making it difficult for villagers to carry out their daily activities. This project will benefit a local [Albanian/Serbian/Roma] community. The mayor of the municipality co-funded the project.

I then ask the following outcome questions (order randomized):

- Imagine you lived in this municipality. Would you vote to support this mayor in the next election? [Yes/No]
- To what extent do you agree with the following statements? [Strongly disagree-Strongly agree] (order randomized)
 - The mayor cares about people like me.
 - The mayor cares about what the international community thinks.
 - The mayor is competent.
 - The mayor is likely to win his next election.
 - The mayor will attract international funding for my community.
- At this time, the [EU/IOM] is considering giving foreign aid to Kosovo. To what extent do you agree or disagree that the parliament should encourage the [EU/IOM] to give foreign aid to Kosovo? [Strongly disagree-Strongly agree]
 - If EU named as funder, displays EU.
 - if IOM named as funder, displays IOM.
 - if local government, evenly displays EU/IOM.

I also intend to conduct mediation analysis to understand to what extent the choice to vote for the politician is mediated by perceptions of affinity, competence, and bias towards the international community.

Outcome	Project target				Primary funder	
	Baseline: Albanian			Baseline: Roma	Baseline: Kosovo	
	Minority (combined)	Serbian	Roma	Serbian	EU	IOM
Vote	-	-	0	-	+	+
People like me	-	-	-	-	+	+
Intl affinity	+	+	+	+	+	+
Competent	-	-	-	0	+	+
Win	-	-	-	0	+	+
Intl funding for community	-	-	0	-	+	+
Future project funding	-	-	-	-	+	+

Table 7: Vignette outcome predictions

Concept	Outcome	Predicted effect
Affinity	The mayor cares about people like me.	+
Competence	The mayor will attract international funding for my community.	+
Competence	The mayor is competent.	+
Competence	The mayor is likely to win his next election.	+
Bias	The mayor cares about what the international community thinks.	-

Table 8: Mediated effects on vote outcome

B.2.1 Alternative vignette

Below is an alternative vignette. In both the original and alternative vignette, I adhere as closely as possible to existing press releases or news articles about aid projects in Kosovo. The village here is a fictional “Novo Selo” as the municipality in which this real project was implemented is almost 100% Albanian, hence the need for a hypothetical text.

Hypothetical, based on real text from USAID

The Mayor of the Municipality joined the residents of Novo Selo/Fshat i Ri to inaugurate the Advancing Kosovo Together - Local Solution Community Initiative project on the Rehabilitation and Extension of the Water Supply System in Novo Selo/Fshat i Ri. The project comprised installing of new pipelines where they were needed and extends the services of the Hidrodrini Regional Water Company, benefitting the inhabitants of the village. The total cost of this project was USD 86,666, where over 80% of the funds were invested by USAID and the remainder by the Municipality. The inhabitants of Novo Selo/Fshat i Ri, primarily the [Roma/Serbian/Albanian] community, will benefit with improved water quality, increased water quantity, and lower consumption of energy, due to the newly installed connection, avoiding the use of the old pump station.

B.3 Conjoint Experiment

I ask respondents to evaluate ten aid projects in a forced choice conjoint design (five pairs of projects). Respondents are asked which project they prefer. Table 9 depicts an example.

	Project A	Project B
Funder	Japan	United States
Sector	education	infrastructure
Municipality	Urban	Urban
Size	5000 Euros	10000 Euros
Beneficiaries	Albanians: 90% (4500 Euros) Roma: 10% (500 Euros)	Albanians: 50% (5000 Euros) Roma: 50% (5000 Euros)

Table 9: Example conjoint design

Categories	Attributes
Funder	US, Turkey, Germany, Japan, EU, Kosovo
Sector	education, infrastructure, business development, cultural heritage, agriculture, conflict reconciliation
Municipality	Urban, Rural
Size	5000, 10000, 25000, 50000, 75000, 100000, 500000, 1000000 Euros
Percent	0, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, 40, 45, 50, 55, 60, 65, 70, 75, 80, 85, 90, 95, 100

Table 10: Example conjoint design

I alter several attributes across tasks. First, I randomize whether the minority group beneficiary is Roma or Serb. The other beneficiary is always Albanian. Second, I randomize one out of the five tasks to have no information about beneficiaries. As one of my outcomes of interest is the absolute amount of aid allocated to Albanians/minorities and another the difference between the amount of aid allocated to Albanians and minorities, this variable is collinear with size (indeed, it is a function of the size of the project). For this outcome, I should be able to factor in the size of the project AMCE for tasks that do not include beneficiaries to account for the collinearity [NOTE: I am not confident I know how to integrate this into my outcome model at the moment]. Table 11 shows an example of a task with no beneficiaries listed.

	Project A	Project B
Funder	Germany	Kosovo
Sector	agriculture	cultural heritage
Municipality	Urban	Rural
Size	25000 Euros	50000 Euros

Table 11: Example conjoint design, no beneficiaries

I will estimate average marginal component effects, or AMCEs, clustered by respondent.

1. The main outcomes of interest are fourfold:

- **Absolute:** To what extent do Albanians want to maximize the amount of aid their co-ethnics receive? I estimate one model with the amount of aid allocated to Albanians.

- **Relative:** To what extent do Albanians want to maximize the amount of aid their co-ethnics receive relative to non-coethnics? I estimate one model with the percentage of aid allocated to Albanians.
- **Proportional:** To what extent do Albanians want to maximize the amount of aid their co-ethnics receive relative to non-coethnics? I estimate one model with the ratio of aid allocated to Albanians compared to non-coethnics.
- **Difference:** To what extent do Albanians want to maximize the amount of aid their co-ethnics receive relative to non-coethnics? I estimate one model with the difference between the amount of aid allocated to Albanians compared to non-coethnics.

2. The secondary effects of interest include:

- *Domestic/foreign funding:* I expect domestic projects to receive less support than foreign projects (due either cost to taxpayers or quality concerns).
- *Sector:* I expect projects with agriculture/business/education/infrastructure (substantive) focuses to receive more support than cultural heritage/conflict reconciliation (symbolic) projects.
- *Municipality:* I expect projects in recipients' own municipality to receive greater support.
- *Size:* I expect larger projects to receive greater support.

3. The interaction effects of interest include:

- *Foreign*Minority:* I expect that respondents will prefer foreign funding for minority projects over domestic funding for minority projects.
- *Sector*Minority:* I expect projects with agriculture/business/education/infrastructure (substantive) with minority focuses to receive more support than cultural heritage/conflict reconciliation (symbolic) projects with minority focuses.

- *Municipality*Minority*: I expect projects in recipients' own municipality to receive less support when targeting minorities.

B.3.1 Heterogenous effects

Quality	Attribute					
	Funder (Foreign)	Sector (Substantive)	Municipality (Own)	Size (Large)	Beneficiary (Serbian)	Beneficiary (Roma)
Ethnicity (Serbian)	+	+	+	+	+	0
Ethnic attachment (high)	+	+	+	+	-	-
Municipality (Serbian)	+	+	+	+	+	0
Aid information (high)	+	+	+	+	-	0
Party (nationalist)	0	+	+	+	-	-
Ideology (conservative)	0	+	+	+	-	-

Table 12: Heterogenous effects of attribute treatments on AMCE for project approval